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Abstract
In the growing literature on decision-making under moral uncertainty,
a number of skeptics have argued that there is an insuperable barrier
to rational “hedging” for the risk of moral error, namely the apparent in-
comparability of moral reasons given by rival theories like Kantianism and
utilitarianism. Various general theories of intertheoretic value comparison
have been proposed to meet this objection, but each suffers from appar-
ently fatal flaws. In this paper, I propose a more modest approach that
aims to identify classes of moral theories that share common principles
strong enough to establish bases for intertheoretic comparison. I show
that, contra the claims of skeptics, there are often rationally perspicuous
grounds for precise, quantitative value comparisons within such classes.
In light of this fact, I argue, the existence of some apparent incompara-
bilities between widely divergent moral theories cannot serve as a general
argument against hedging for one’s moral uncertainties.
1 Introduction
Moral philosophers have recently begun paying systematic attention to the ques-
tion of how agents rationally ought to act when they divide their beliefs among
competing moral principles or theories that offer conflicting prescriptions with
respect to some moral dilemma. A popular and intuitively appealing view is that
agents in some circumstances should “hedge” for their moral uncertainties—that
is, should be responsive both to the likelihood that a given moral theory is cor-
rect and to the strength of the reasons it posits for or against a given practical
option. Such moral hedging can take many forms, but most straightforwardly,
it might be expressed by a principle that directs agents to maximize “expected
moral rightness,” in a way formally analogous to the dictates of standard ex-
pected utility theory for agents who are uncertain of the consequences of their
actions. This sort of hedging is endorsed by Lockhart (2000), Sepielli (2009,
2010), and MacAskill (2014), among others.
The idea of moral hedging is appealing both because of its potential strength—
it promises to deliver a systematic, determinable resolution to all questions of
rational choice under moral uncertainty—and because of the natural continuity
it suggests between the requirements of rationality that govern choice under
moral and empirical uncertainty. Hedging also strikes us as intuitively correct
in many cases: for instance, if I judge that meat-eating is most likely permissible
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but may well be a grave moral wrong, I seem to have at least some subjective
reason to avoid eating meat, that varies both with my credence that it is wrong
to do so and with the degree of potential wrongness that my beliefs attribute.
And it seems that such reasons can at least sometimes outweigh weak prudential
reasons in favor of eating meat, as the hedging thesis implies.
But moral hedging also faces several significant obstacles and objections.
Among these, the most central conceptually and the problem that has so far
proven least tractable is the problem of intertheoretic value comparisons (PIVC):
the problem of finding some non-arbitrary basis for comparing degrees of moral
value and disvalue attributed to practical options by competing moral theories.1
For instance, consider an agent who must decide whether to kill one to save five,
and divides her beliefs evenly between classical utilitarianism, which directs her
to kill the one, and an absolutist deontological theory, which directs her to let
the five die. The possibility of resolving this dilemma by moral hedging seems
to require that there be some (quantitative) answer to the question of how the
moral value of saving a life, according to classical utilitarianism, compares with
the wrongness of killing an innocent person, according to absolutist deontology.
It is hard to imagine what could make any answer to this question—or at least,
any intuitively plausible answer—correct, let alone how we could discover that
answer. Suppose that an agent who divides her moral beliefs as just described
ought to kill the one iff the number of lives she would thereby save is greater
than or equal to seven. On what basis could we ever hope to establish that this
was in fact the proper threshold, rather than six, or twelve, or anything else?
A number of philosophers offered solutions to PIVC, but these extant pro-
posals are subject to compelling objections, and none has achieved widespread
acceptance. The first such proposal, Ted Lockhart’s “Principle of Equity among
Moral Theories” (PEMT) holds that, in any choice situation, the maximum and
minimum degrees of value assigned to any option by each moral theory in which
the agent has positive credence should be treated as equal (Lockhart, 2000, p.
84). But this view has several fatal drawbacks, described in detail by Sepielli
(2013): For instance, because PEMT generates inconsistent comparisons be-
tween the same pair of theories across different choice situations, it can require
an agent to knowingly choose a course of action that is strictly dominated, i.e.
worse than some available alternative according to every moral theory in which
she has positive credence. Sepielli in turn proposes, without endorsing, a vari-
ant of Lockhart’s principle that he calls the “Conceivability PEMT,” on which
the maximum and minimum conceivable degrees of value according to any pair
of theories should be treated as equal. But, as he notes, this principle does
not permit comparisons between theories, like most forms of consequentialism,
according to which there are no maximum or minimum degrees of value.
In his (2009), Sepielli endorsed a very different approach according to which
we may normalize a pair of theories with one another by finding some set of
options such that the two theories agree on the ratios of value differences among
those options, and infer from this that the theories regard the value differences
themselves among these options as equal in magnitude, thereby establishing a
“background ranking” of options that the two theories have in common. But
as MacAskill (2014) points out, there may be several such sets of options for
1The identification of the problem under this name, so far as I can tell, is due to Ross
(2006). But it is raised under different names by earlier sources, e.g. Hudson (1989), Gracely
(1996), and Lockhart (2000).
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a given pair of theories that generate inconsistent comparisons between the
theories (and in subsequent work Sepielli abandons the proposal for this reason
(Sepielli, 2010, pp. 180-181)).
Ross (2006) suggests that we can work backwards from our considered judg-
ments that a particular response to a given dilemma would be most rational
given a particular state of moral uncertainty to the intertheoretic value compar-
isons that support these judgments. But apart from worries about the reliability
of these judgments of rationality, Ross’s approach leaves us without any satisfy-
ing explanation for the comparisons we infer, without any understanding of why
so many units of value according to T1 are equivalent to the wrongness of such-
and-such action according to T2. And as critics of moral hedging (e.g. Hudson
(1989), Nissan-Rozen (2015)) have doubted whether any such explanation is
possible, this approach at best leaves a large part of the problem unresolved.
These difficulties led opponents of moral hedging to suggest that PIVC is
simply insoluble, and that this constitutes a decisive objection to hedging.2
The aim of the present paper is to answer this objection. My strategy is simple:
show that there are at least some cases in which moral hedging is possible,
and then argue that if such cases exist, the problem of intertheoretic value
comparisons cannot constitute an argument against moral hedging in general—
even if there turn out to be other cases in which intertheoretic value comparisons
are genuinely impossible.
The approach to intertheoretic comparison that I will propose differs from
those of Lockhart and Sepielli in that it normalizes the value scales of rival the-
ories based on the shared content of those theories—for instance, their shared
endorsement of certain kinds of goods as bearers of non-derivative moral value—
rather than structural features of each theory (like the range of its value assign-
ments, as in Lockhart’s PEMT) or structural similarities between theories (like
matching value difference ratios, as in Sepielli’s background rankings approach).
It differs from Ross’s proposal in that it offers an explanation for why certain
intertheoretic value comparisons hold, an explanation grounded in the common
content of the theories being compared. But my approach also differs from these
earlier proposals in its relative lack of ambition: I aim, in this paper, not to give
a general account of intertheoretic value comparisons, but only to establish that
such comparisons are sometimes possible (and in the process, to establish one
sort of sufficient condition for intertheoretic comparability).
I begin in the next section by describing a simple case of moral uncertainty
in which there seems to be a rationally perspicuous, non-arbitrary standard for
intertheoretic value comparisons. This case suggests the more general idea that
there are clusters of moral theories (what I will call “comparability classes”)
that share common principles strong enough to establish procedures for moral
hedging, which sometimes will and sometimes will not take the form of expected
value maximization. In §3, I argue that this approach generalizes beyond the
simple sort of case described in §2, while conceding that its scope may still
turn out to be relatively limited. In §4, I argue that so long as a compelling
basis for intertheoretic value comparisons exists in some cases, PIVC cannot be
taken as an objection to moral hedging as such—even if hedging is sometimes
2Among those who have argued against moral hedging are Hudson (1989), Gracely (1996),
Gustafsson and Torpman (2014), Weatherson (2014), Harman (2015), Nissan-Rozen (2015),
and Hedden (2016). Of these, Gracely, Gustafsson and Torpman, Nissan-Rozen, and Hedden
lay particular stress on PIVC as an objection to hedging.
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impossible, this is no reason to forgo it when it is. Instead, I will argue, if there
is a line to be drawn between uncertainties for which a hedging procedure is
appropriate and those for which it is not, that line should be drawn not between
moral and empirical uncertainty but rather between those uncertainties that
establish barriers to rational comparison and those that do not. §5 concludes
by examining the implications of the comparability class approach for two other
worries about moral hedging.
2 A case study for PIVC: Pluralistic consequen-
tialism
We begin with a simple case. Consider an agent Clara whose moral beliefs
are as follows: (i) She is certain that consequentialism is true. (ii) She is sure
that pleasure and pain have basic (non-derivative) moral value and disvalue,
respectively. But (iii) she is uncertain whether other things, like friendship,
beauty/aesthetic appreciation, knowledge, and so forth have basic moral value
as well. Thus, she divides her beliefs between monistic, hedonistic consequen-
tialism and one or more forms of value-pluralistic consequentialism. Internal
to any of the pluralistic theories she finds plausible, there is some basis for
comparison (an “exchange rate”) between hedons and the various other basic
forms of value posited by that theory—none of the theories to which she as-
signs positive credence, that is, treat the various basic bearers of moral value as
incomparable—but insofar as she is uncertain whether the monistic or which of
the various pluralistic theories is correct, she is uncertain of the correct exchange
rate between these various forms of value.3
It seems to me that, in Clara’s particular state of moral uncertainty, PIVC
has no great force, and that when her various moral theories come into conflict,
she should experience no great difficulty in hedging for her uncertainties. To
illustrate, start with a simplest version of the case: Suppose that Clara divides
her beliefs between just two theories, the monistic hedonistic theory T1 and
a theory T2 according to which there are two kinds of non-derivative goods,
hedonic and aesthetic. We may stipulate an arbitrary unit of hedonic value,
the hedon, and may then define a unit of aesthetic value, the aestheton, as the
quantity of aesthetic value that is equal in value to a hedon according to T2.
Now suppose Clara assigns probability p to T1 and probability (1 − p) to T2.
In this state, I propose, she can quite naturally calculate the expected value of
any practical option O as follows.
EV(O) = hedons(O) + (1− p)(aesthetons(O))
3By an “exchange rate” between two kinds of value-bearer V1 and V2 I mean a principle
that specifies when a given quantity of V1 has greater, less, or equal value to a given quantity
of V2 (and, where ratio scale comparisons are possible, specifies the ratio between the values of
these two quantities). A first-order moral theory, like pluralistic consequentialism, that treats
two value-bearers like pleasure and beauty as fully comparable will thus specify an exchange
rate between them. But if an agent divides her beliefs between several first-order theories that
posit different exchange rates between two kinds of value, she may appeal to a second-order
theory of decision-making under moral uncertainty that specifies a new exchange rate, perhaps
a weighted average of the exchange rates given by the various first-order theories in which she
has positive credence, as I will shortly illustrate.
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Prima facie, it seems quite plausible that an agent in Clara’s doxastic state
rationally ought to choose the option that maximizes this formula for expected
value. The two theories in which Clara has positive credence agree on the value
of hedonic goods—take it as a stipulation, to which we will return shortly, that
T1 and T2 differ not at all in the grounds they offer for, or anything else they
have to say about, the intrinsic value of a hedon, i.e. that Clara suffers from no
uncertainty regarding the value of hedonic goods—and as a result T2 contains
within itself, in the exchange rate it posits between hedonic and aesthetic goods,
a basis for comparing its own evaluation of practical options to the exclusively
hedonistic evaluations of T1.
The suggestion from this simplest version of the case of Clara can be easily
generalized. Let Clara distribute her beliefs over any number of pluralistic
theories, along with her monistic theory, so long as all those theories agree on the
value of hedonic goods. Then we can simply create a unit of value for each theory
equal to the quantity of value that it assigns to a single hedon (an empirically
measurable unit of pleasure/pain, whose value, we have by stipulation every
reason to believe, remains constant across theories), thereby normalizing the
value scales of the various competing theories. Then we can simply compute
the expected value of an option O across theories {T1, T2, ..., Tn} by something
very much like the standard formula for expected value:
EV(O) =
n∑
i=1
(EV(O)|Ti)(p(Ti))
This formula will be applicable even to an agent who distributes her belief
over infinitely many competing theories, corresponding for instance to all pos-
sible real-valued exchange rates between hedonic and other forms of value over
some bounded interval. In fact, we can generalize even further, dropping the
assumption that there is a category of value-bearer common to every theory
in which Clara has positive credence. Suppose, for instance, that Clara re-
gards hedonic experience, beauty, and knowledge all as potential non-derivative
value-bearers, and that her credences regarding the value of each of these goods
are mutually independent, so that she has some credence in theories according
to which all, none, or any other combination of the three are non-derivative
goods. Comparisons between these various goods can nevertheless be made by
appealing to the exchange rates given by the various pluralistic theories that
value more than one of the goods in question, so long as these exchange rates
are consistent across the relevant pluralistic theories. Thus, for instance, the
monistic theory according to which only pleasure is a non-derivative good and
the monistic theory according to which only knowledge is a non-derivative good
are made comparable by the agent’s credence in one or more theories according
to which both are non-derivative goods.
What I have said so far involves an important presupposition, namely that
when two theories agree that some feature of the world is a non-derivative bearer
of moral value, those two theories attribute the same kind and same degree of
value to that phenomenon—e.g., that the value of a hedon according to Clara’s
hedonistic theory is equal to the value of a hedon according to the pluralistic
theory that also values aesthetic goods. Clearly, this need not always be the
case. For instance, Clara might divide her metaethical beliefs between a ro-
bust moral realism and a fairly anemic anti-realism, and it might turn out that
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her credence in hedonistic consequentialism is mostly or entirely conditioned on
her credence in robust realism while her credence in rival pluralistic theories is
mostly or entirely conditioned on her credence in anti-realism. (Suppose she
inclines toward a hedonistic view on which certain qualia have intrinsic value or
disvalue entirely independent of our beliefs, attitudes, etc, which we are morally
required to maximize. But if this view turns out to be wrong, she believes,
then morality can only consist in the pursuit of whatever we contingently hap-
pen to value in some distinctively moral way, which includes pleasure but also
knowledge, aesthetic goods, friendship, etc.) In this case, the sort of procedure
that I have described no longer seems rationally compelling: although the two
views to which she assigns positive credence both treat pleasure as a bearer of
non-derivative moral value, there is no obvious reason to think that they assign
the same degree of value to a given unit of pleasure.
But there is no reason to assume that such problems will always arise. An
agent may be uncertain about first-order moral questions, like whether anything
besides pleasure and pain has non-derivative value, without this reflecting any
underlying metaethical uncertainties. An agent who divides her beliefs between
various monistic and pluralistic theories might nevertheless be in no doubt as to
the nature, basis, or degree of value possessed by some category of goods, like
hedonic goods, that all the theories she entertains recognize as non-derivatively
valuable.4 The lack of any uncertainty concerning hedonic value makes it a
constant feature of the various theories in which she has positive credence, and
allows it to serve as a basis for normalization.
To sum up, then, the suggestion is this: An agent who is certain that some
form of (maximizing, agent-neutral) consequentialism is correct, but uncertain—
even quite radically uncertain—about what sorts of things have value or dis-
value nevertheless can find in the shared (or overlapping) content of the various
first-order theories to which she assigns positive credence sufficient basis for ra-
tionally perspicuous, non-arbitrary intertheoretic value comparisons. Of course,
nothing I have said establishes incontrovertibly that an agent who divides her
beliefs among such theories is rationally required to maximize expected value,
computed in the sort of way I have described. I have only tried to establish
that, contra the assertions of pessimists about PIVC, there is a reasonable,
non-arbitrary way of computing expected value in the face of certain intertheo-
retic moral uncertainties.
Is the case we have been considering an isolated exception in this respect?
There is no use denying that it is an especially favorable case—a case of interthe-
oretic moral uncertainty that “behaves” helpfully like empirical uncertainty and
seems to present only one salient option for normalizing the various theories in
which the agent has positive credence. Nevertheless, it seems to me, there is
an underlying idea that has the potential to generalize quite widely: namely,
that clusters of moral theories united by the right common content—and par-
ticularly, by common procedures for addressing empirical uncertainties about
morally salient features of the world—can make use of those shared assumptions
4Alternatively, if she does have metaethical uncertainties about the nature of value, these
may be probabilistically independent of her first-order moral beliefs. Just as metaethical
uncertainties need not pose any problem for an agent maximizing expected utility in the
face of empirical uncertainties, so long as the metaethical and empirical uncertainties are
probabilistically independent, so those metaethical uncertainties need pose no obstacle to
hedging for first-order moral uncertainties, so long as the two are independent.
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as a basis for intertheoretic values comparisons. Let’s call such clusters of moral
theories whose shared features permit quantitative comparisons of moral value
between their members comparability classes. In the next section, we will briefly
examine two more potential comparability classes of theories, and consider how
far the comparability class strategy can generalize. Then we will turn to the im-
plications of the existence of such comparability classes for the broader problem
of decision-making under moral uncertainty.
3 The scope of the strategy
To illustrate the general idea (and more especially, to show that we were not
in the last section simply taking advantage of an idiosyncratic feature of con-
sequentialist moral theories), let’s consider another case far afield from the
first: namely, absolutist deontological theories that categorically prohibit cer-
tain kinds of actions like telling a lie, breaking a promise, or killing the innocent.
No less than consequentialists, defenders of such theories must find something to
say about how agents ought to act under morally relevant empirical uncertainty,
e.g. uncertainty whether some act would violate a deontological constraint. If I
am absolutely prohibited from breaking my promises, what should I do when I
am unsure whether I made some particular commitment as part of a long-ago
act of promising? If I am absolutely prohibited from killing the innocent, how
am I to assess courses of action that carry some (perhaps moderate to van-
ishingly small) risk of killing the innocent, or when I have good reason to kill
(in defense of myself or others) someone who might be either an innocent or a
malevolent threat?5
Let’s imagine, then, a deontologist David who has the following simple view
of how to deal with uncertainty: an absolute moral requirement is incumbent on
an agent whenever his degree of belief that the conditions of that requirement are
satisfied is greater than .5. So, for instance, if it is in his power to perform some
action that he might or might not have promised to perform, he is absolutely
required to perform it so long as he believes it more likely than not that he
did so promise; he is absolutely prohibited from uttering a particular sentence
if he believes it more likely than not that his intention in doing so would be to
deceive; and so on.
This sort of view is open to serious objections, but it seems to me as plausible
as anything else deontological absolutists can say about the problem of uncer-
tainty, so let us suppose that this is how some plausible class of deontological
5This last possibility is suggested by Jackson and Smith (2006). They describe a case in
which a skier is headed down a mountain in a direction that will trigger an avalanche, killing
ten people, unless you shoot and kill him. You are uncertain whether the skier is ignorant of
the danger he poses to the ten and therefore morally innocent, or intentionally trying to bring
about their deaths. The deontological theory to which you subscribe permits (or requires)
you to shoot the skier in the latter case but prohibits it absolutely in the former.
As Jackson and Smith point out, formulating the antecedents of deontological principles
in terms of intentions—e.g. that we are prohibited not from breaking a promise or killing
the innocent but from forming an intention to break a promise or kill the innocent—does
not avoid the need to deal with uncertainty, both because (as even Kant admits) we can be
quite radically uncertain about the contents of our own intentions and because it is far from
obvious whether and in what cases forming an intention to perform some action that I believe
I may have promised not to do, or to kill someone who may be innocent, should count as
impermissibly forming an intention to break my promise or to kill the innocent.
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theories deals with the problem.6 Now, just as the injunction to maximize ex-
pected value held in common by the various consequentialist theories considered
in the last section extends easily to encompass intertheoretic moral uncertainty
(among theories of the relevant class) as well as empirical uncertainty, so too the
probability threshold view of deontological obligations provides ready guidance
to an agent like David who divides his beliefs between various deontological
theories that have this threshold view in common.
Suppose, for instance, that David must decide whether to kill Thomas in
order to prevent Thomas from killing ten innocent people. He is empirically
uncertain whether Thomas is an innocent threat or a malevolent aggressor, but
he is also morally uncertain, dividing his beliefs between one absolutist deonto-
logical theory that prohibits the killing of innocent threats in other-defense and
another that permits it. David, then, must divide his beliefs among three salient
possibilities: (i) Thomas is a non-innocent threat, and may therefore permissi-
bly be killed to save a greater number. (ii) Thomas is an innocent threat, and
innocent threats may permissibly be killed. (iii) Thomas is an innocent threat,
and innocent threats may not permissibly be killed.
It seems quite natural to say, given that both moral theories to which David
assigns positive credence agree on a probability threshold of .5 at which deon-
tological prohibitions subjectively “kick in,” that he is prohibited from killing
Thomas iff the probability he assigns to possibility (iii)—that is, the conjunc-
tion of the empirical belief that Thomas is an innocent threat and the moral
belief that it is absolutely impermissible to kill an innocent threat—is greater
than .5. Absent some prior reason for David to treat moral and empirical un-
certainty differently in his practical deliberations, the principle he accepts with
certainty, that it is subjectively wrong or impermissible to choose some practi-
cal option O whenever O carries a risk greater than .5 of violating an absolute
moral constraint, seems to address the former as much as the latter.
Again, there is no knockdown positive argument that this is the only ratio-
nal way for an agent in David’s position to deliberate, any more than there is
a knockdown argument that the .5 probability threshold is the right way for
deontologists to deal with empirical uncertainty. The point, as before, is sim-
ply that there is a rationally perspicuous, non-arbitrary way of responding to
a particular kind of intertheoretic moral uncertainty that takes advantage of
principles for dealing with empirical uncertainty shared by some class of moral
theories over which an agent distributes his or her credence.
Let’s consider one more case of intertheoretic uncertainty, drawn once again
from the consequentialist side of the moral universe, that highlights one impor-
tant difficulty for intertheoretic comparisons relevant to the discussion in the
previous section. Consider an agent Simone who divides her credence between
classical utilitarianism and a sufficientarian theory that prioritizes the interests
of those below some threshold of wellbeing, granting their interests twice the
weight of those above the threshold. It may seem non-obvious how Simone
should compare these two theories when they come into conflict, since it is non-
obvious whether the sufficientarian theory gives more weight to the interests of
those below the sufficiency threshold, less weight to the interests of those above
the sufficiency threshold, or some combination of both. This sort of case raises
6Two prominent responses to Jackson and Smith’s (2006) uncertainty-based objection to
absolutist deontology, namely Hawley (2008) and Aboodi et al. (2008), both defend versions
of this “threshold” proposal.
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the worry that even among maximizing consequentialist theories, comparability
may be the exception rather than the rule.
But although this case is more difficult than the hedonism/pluralism case
of the last section, it nevertheless seems to me that Simone may well be in
a position to make practically useful comparisons between her utilitarian and
sufficientarian theories. In general, the question of whether the sufficientarian
theory values the interests of the worse off more, or the interests of the better
off less, ought to have an answer, even if it is non-obvious. This answer is to
be found by examining the content of the theory that underlies and explains its
assignments of value to states of affairs or practical options. For instance, the
version of the sufficientarian theory to which Simone assigns positive credence
might hold that, in addition to the value of wellbeing, there is some other “dis-
tributive” value like fairness or equality that counts in favor of raising people
up to a threshold of adequate wellbeing. Or perhaps it holds that deprivation
of basic needs, opportunities, etc is a disvalue over and above the suffering and
absence of happiness that accompany it. In either of these cases, it would be
clear that the prioritarian theory does not assign less value to the interests of
the better off, but rather assigns more value to the interests of the worse off. On
the other hand, Simone’s sufficientarian theory might be a “second-personal”
version of consequentialism according to which, while the intrinsic value of hu-
man wellbeing does not diminish as absolute levels of wellbeing increase, once
one has reached an adequate level of wellbeing one can no longer reasonably
demand of other agents that they value your wellbeing equally with their own.7
In this case, the sufficientarian theory attaches less weight to the interests of
the better off than the utilitarian theory, while attaching equal weight to the
interests of the worse off.
It’s possible, of course, that the version of sufficientarianism to which our
agent assigns positive credence simply posits as a brute fact that the interests
of those below the threshold carry more weight. In this case, there would seem
to be no basis internal to the theories for normalizing them in any particular
way. Nonetheless, it might still be plausible to claim that the sufficientarian
theory assigns at least as much weight to the interests of the less well off as
classical utilitarianism, and assigns no more weight to the interests of the better
off. In this case, we would have rough comparability : The range of allowable
normalizations between the theories would be constrained by the requirement
that the ratio r between the value of the interests of the least well off according
to sufficientarianism and the value of their interests according to utilitarianism
satisfy 1 ≤ r ≤ 2. Such rough comparability would tell Simone determinately
which course of action has highest expected moral value in many, though of
course not all, cases where her two theories conflict.
Similar things might be said about other, structurally similar cases, for in-
stance an agent who divides her beliefs between two or more versions of plural-
istic consequentialism, all of which assign non-derivative value to both hedonic
and aesthetic goods, but which differ concerning the relative weight of these
goods.8 There is at least a hope, though no guarantee, that the explanations
7Of course, this sort of theory would presumably differ from the versions given above in
holding that every agent has, at least, the option of valuing her own interests equally with
those of the less well off, even if she herself is above the sufficiency threshold for wellbeing.
8I thank an anonymous reviewer for this example, and for encouraging me to consider this
category of cases.
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these theories offer for their relative weightings of hedonic and aesthetic value
will furnish some perspicuous basis for precise intertheoretic comparisons. And
if this hope is frustrated, we may at least be able to make rough comparisons.
Assuming I am right that intertheoretic comparability exists in (at least
some variants of) the cases we have so far discussed, how widespread is the
underlying phenomenon? Is every moral theory comparable with at least some
closely related alternative theories, or are there some theories such that any un-
certainty, concerning even the smallest of moral minutiae, generates full-blown
intertheoretic incomparability that would preclude moral hedging? And are
comparability classes of moral theories typically small, permitting intertheo-
retic comparison and hedging only for a few limited forms of moral uncertainty
among very similar theories (e.g. uncertainty about which features of the world
are value-bearers or which categories of action are subject to absolute moral
prohibition), or can we find plausible bases for comparability that unite larger
classes of theories, e.g. all forms of maximizing act consequentialism?
These questions, it seems to me, can only be answered by examining many
individual cases on their own terms. And I have only been able to discuss a
few of the myriad sorts of moral uncertainty that might be thought to generate
barriers to intertheoretic value comparisons. It must be conceded, then, that
comparability classes of normative theories may turn out to be few, small, and
far between. Nevertheless, I will argue in the next section, the existence of such
classes is enough to answer the argument from PIVC to a general rejection of
hedging, and even limited intertheoretic comparability may play an important
role in a general procedure for rational decision-making under moral uncertainty.
4 Is incomparability anywhere a threat to com-
parability everywhere?
So far I have suggested that an agent who divides her beliefs among a class of
sufficiently similar moral theories can possess a rational basis for intertheoretic
value comparisons and hence for moral hedging. But I have not addressed the
(doubtless more realistic) case of an agent who assigns positive degrees of belief
to a much more diverse class of theories, a class that shares no obvious structural
features that would naturally ground such comparisons—e.g. an agent who
assigns positive credence both to a maximizing consequentialist theory and to
an absolutist deontological theory.
Toward the end of this section I will mention some possible approaches to
these “hard cases” of intertheoretic value comparison, but I have no general
solution to offer. Absent such a solution, the pessimist about intertheoretic
comparisons may argue as follows: “The principle of hedging under moral un-
certainty requires that agents be able to compare degrees of value across theories
to which they assign positive degrees of belief, in general. Even if there are some
easy cases in which it looks like such comparisons can be made, as long as the
hard cases remain unresolved, the problem of intertheoretic value comparisons
as a whole is unresolved and so still poses a decisive obstacle to the principle of
intertheoretic moral hedging.”
My reply is simply this: Someone who opposes any form of hedging for moral
uncertainty, but shares the ordinary view that agents should be responsive to
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empirical risks and uncertainties, must justify drawing a line between the moral
and the empirical. What the above cases of intertheoretic comparability show
is that PIVC cannot justify drawing such a line. Rather, absent some other
argument that agents should not be responsive to their moral uncertainties,9
problems of incomparability suggest the need for special principles of rationality
to handle incomparability, rather than special principles (or a special absence of
principles) for responding to moral as opposed to empirical uncertainty.
The existence of plausible procedures for value comparison in certain cases
of intertheoretic moral uncertainty, taken together with the various forms in
incomparability that can arise in the absence of any moral (or other normative)
uncertainty, suggests that the problem of incomparability is simply orthogonal
to the distinction between moral and empirical uncertainty. Just as intertheo-
retic value comparisons do not always generate (even apparent) incomparability,
so (apparent) incomparability of normative considerations does not arise only in
the context of intertheoretic comparisons. Many philosophers, for instance, have
held that certain pairs of moral values are genuinely incomparable—that is to
say, they have advocated first-order moral theories that generate intratheoretic
incomparability. An agent might believe, say, that patriotic and familial obliga-
tions are genuinely incomparable, such that when these values come into conflict
(as when she feels called to volunteer for a war of national self-defense, but can-
not do so without abandoning an ailing relative), there is no uniquely rational
resolution. Incomparability may arise in more mundane, non-moral contexts as
well—for instance, if I am shopping for home decor and must choose between
satisfying my own aesthetic sensibilities and pleasing my spouse, whose tastes
I regard as gauche.10 Finally, even on a simple utilitarian theory of value that
does not admit this sort of incomparability, purely empirical uncertainty can
give rise to a different species of incomparability, as it does in the Pasadena
Game (Nover and Ha´jek, 2004), for which the expected values of playing and
not playing appear to be incomparable.
But it would be absurd, on the basis of such cases, to deny the rationality
of quantitative value comparisons in general, to claim that the existence of one
or more of these forms of incomparability shows that the procedure of expected
value maximization is unreasonable in any context and hence to claim that there
is no rational basis, say, for investors in the stock market to choose investments
that maximize their expected financial returns. Likewise, it is equally absurd
to suggest that the (apparent) impossibility of quantitative comparison between
utilitarian and deontological moral considerations should also preclude compar-
isons, e.g., among possible values in a consequentialist scheme under conditions
of more limited moral uncertainty.11
9Many such arguments have been attempted; see for instance Weatherson (2014), Harman
(2015).
10I thank an anonymous reviewer for this example.
11MacAskill (2013) points out that incomparability can be “infectious” in that an agent
who has any positive credence, however slight, that incomparable values are at stake in a
given choice situation and tries to calculate the expected value of her various options will
in general find them to be undefined. But again, this worry is not unique to the problem of
moral uncertainty, and is not solved by ignoring moral uncertainty. The investor who has some
vanishingly small credence that her investment decisions implicate values like patriotism and
family that she judges, as a matter of first-order moral theory, to be incomparable, will find
herself in a similar predicament. The problem of infectious incomparability, in this respect,
is structurally analogous to more familiar decision-theoretic problems like Pascal’s Wager (a
problem, one might say, of “infectious infinities”), and must likewise be resolved in a general
11
If there is genuine incomparability between the considerations put forward
by certain pairs of moral theories, then a division should be drawn between
the principles of rationality to be employed where comparison is possible and
those to be employed where it is not. What might such a division look like?
I will close this section by describing, very speculatively, a picture that seems
to emerge from the idea that it is sometimes but not always possible to make
non-arbitrary intertheoretic comparisons of value.
Very generally, the picture is that the sorts of two-level procedures for prac-
tical deliberation that opponents of moral hedging have suggested may be recast
with the boundary between levels drawn not in terms of empirical vs. moral
uncertainty but rather in terms of uncertainty within vs. between comparability
classes of moral theories whose shared assumptions can ground intertheoretic
value comparisons.12
Such a two-level procedure, as advocated by the opponents of hedging, di-
rects an agent to respond to her empirical uncertainties in ordinary, intuitive
ways (e.g. by maximizing expected value), but with respect to her moral beliefs,
they direct her either to “take her best guess” and base her deliberations, judg-
ments of the value of consequences, etc on the moral theory to which she assigns
the largest portion of her credence (the so-called My Favorite Theory view, ad-
vocated inter alia by Gracely (1996) and Gustafsson and Torpman (2014)) or
to simply act on the true moral theory, regardless of her moral beliefs or the
evidence available to her (the view advocated inter alia by Weatherson (2014),
Harman (2015), and Hedden (2016)).13
My suggestion instead is that if such a two-level procedure is appropriate,
the role in such procedures that opponents of hedging give to moral theories
(as either subject to a “best guess” principle or completely belief-insensitive in
their deliberative role) is better given to comparability classes of moral theories.
Thus it might be, for instance, that the agent who finds herself faced with a
trolley dilemma and divides her beliefs between utilitarian and deontological
theories has no alternative but to take her best guess as to which sort of theory
is correct—that is, there may turn out to be no rational procedure by which she
can weigh these very different sorts of moral considerations against each other.
But an agent whose relevant moral uncertainties are within a class of sufficiently
similar deontological or consequentialist theories can do better than guessing,
and should. And an agent who distributes her beliefs over various consequen-
tialist and deontological theories may at least weigh some of her uncertainties,
e.g. between versions of consequentialism that accept different theories of value,
before incomparability forces her to adopt another decision procedure (say, act-
way by decision theory.
12Somewhat more precisely, a comparability class can be defined as a class of comprehen-
sive moral theories (maximal consistent sets of moral propositions) that bear the relation of
comparability to some particular theory. I will assume, though I have not argued, that in-
tertheoretic comparability is an equivalence relation, i.e. transitive, reflexive, and symmetric.
Reflexivity and symmetry seem uncontroversial. It is less obvious, but still quite plausible,
that intertheoretic comparability must be transitive, i.e. that if comparison is possible be-
tween the moral considerations offered by theories T1 and T2 and likewise between T2 and T3,
then comparison must be possible between T1 and T3.
13These views may be described, more succinctly but in a way that somewhat disguises
the two-level structure, by saying that an agent subjectively ought to choose the option that
is implied to be most subjectively choiceworthy by the combination of the agent’s empirical
belief state and either (a) the moral theory to which she assigns the greatest portion of her
credence or (b) the true moral theory.
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ing on the aggregated verdict of the consequentialist theories in which she has
positive credence, if she regards consequentialism in general as more plausible
than deontology).14
Nonetheless, I have not denied that there may be valid bases for intertheo-
retic comparison besides the shared-content approach I have described in this
paper. So two possibilities remain open: Either there is some non-obvious ba-
sis for intertheoretic value comparisons between very diverse moral theories, in
which case (setting aside other objections) agents can engage in “global” moral
hedging, or else rational deliberation for an agent who is widely uncertain about
both empirical and moral matters will involve a two-level procedure of compar-
ing and weighing considerations within comparability classes of theories followed
by some other (e.g. best-guess) procedure between comparability classes.
One version of the former approach is advocated by MacAskill (2014), who
argues that where no other basis for comparability exists, moral theories should
be normalized at the variance of their value assignments (just as Sepielli’s Con-
ceivability PEMT would normalize theories at the range of their value assign-
ments). Such proposals are intuitively attractive to the extent they can vindi-
cate the common judgment that certain comparisons are possible even among
vastly disparate theories. For instance, consider an agent who divides her be-
liefs equally between classical utilitarianism and Kantianism, and must decide
whether to push one innocent person in front of a trolley, causing her death,
in order to both save the life of a second innocent person and prevent $1000
worth of damage to a third innocent person’s car. It seems intuitive that the
wrongness of killing an innocent person in this way according to Kantianism is
greater than the rightness of preventing $1000 worth of damage to an automo-
bile according to utilitarianism. (If the intuition is not immediate, suppose that
the car’s owner is prosperous, well-insured, and has two more cars at home.)
If a strategy like MacAskill’s can succeed, even with less then perfect gen-
erality (e.g., as MacAskill suggests, allowing comparisons between cardinal but
not ordinal theories), then co-membership in a comparability class of theories
is not a necessary condition for intertheoretic comparability. My purpose has
only been to argue that it is a sufficient condition, and that this defeats the ar-
gument from the problem of intertheoretic value comparisons to the conclusion
that one ought never hedge for one’s moral uncertainties.15
14This approach to choice under moral uncertainty would have the advantage of at least
mitigating the most important objection to the My Favorite Theory view, namely the problem
of theory individuation. Gustafsson and Torpman, who give the most detailed defense of MFT
in the literature to date, stipulate that an agent should treat two moral theories as distinct
unless she is certain that they will never yield different practical prescriptions (Gustafsson and
Torpman, 2014, p. 13). But as MacAskill points out, this implies that an agent who distributes
her beliefs over many fine-grained moral theories may well be required to act on a theory in
which she has minuscule credence, even when this theory prescribes a course of action that
she believes with near-certainty is much worse than some available alternative (MacAskill,
2014, pp. 24-25). Since comparability classes of moral theories are, plausibly, much less fined-
grained than individual theories, a version of MFT that allowed hedging within comparability
classes would at least weaken the intuitive force of this objection.
15I thank an anonymous reviewer for encouraging me to clarify this point.
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5 Conclusion
I have argued that that PIVC is not an objection to moral hedging as such, since
within certain classes of moral theories, intertheoretic value comparisons appear
to be straightforwardly possible and well-motivated. And I have suggested, more
tentatively, that we should look for a distinction between the principles of ratio-
nality that govern not empirical vs. moral uncertainty, but rather uncertainty
within vs. between comparability classes of moral theories.
Let me close by drawing out the implications of this idea for two other ob-
jections to moral hedging. The first, alluded to in passing in the first section, is
a worry about “grounding”: If the true comprehensive moral theory is the sum
of all moral truths, and this theory holds that the considerations distinctively
forwarded by other, false moral theories have no (non-derivative) moral signifi-
cance, then what moral facts could possibly serve to “ground” or make true any
purported exchange rate between the values of rival moral theories?16
A second, closely related objection holds that moral hedging initiates a vi-
cious regress: If, before acting on any normative principle, we must always weigh
the possibility that the principle is mistaken, this requirement will apply as well
to those “second-order” principles that we use to do the weighing, e.g. to the
principles that tell us how to hedge for our first-order moral uncertainties. But
then if we are at all uncertain about these second-order principles, we will need
“third-order” principles that tell us how to weigh the demands of competing
second-order principles against one another, and so on ad infinitum.
The more modest idea of hedging within comparability classes of moral theo-
ries suggests a response (or at least a partial response) to both these objections.
Our original agent Clara who divides her beliefs among a variety of monis-
tic and pluralistic consequentialist theories can say quite easily what grounds
the comparisons she makes between the prescriptions of these various theories:
namely, the comparisons between categories of value-bearer internal to the the-
ories themselves. Even if the pluralistic theories that establish exchange rates
between, say, hedons and aesthetons, turn out to be false, the rationality of the
hedging procedure can be adequately grounded by her credence in these theo-
ries plus true principles of rationality that tell her, where possible, to maximize
the expected value of her choices, or more generally to seek the good, avoid
16This line of objection to hedging has been suggested by several philosophers, though to
the best of my knowledge it has not been identified as a distinct line of argument in the recent
literature. I take this worry about grounding to be, for example, at least one of the lines
of argument suggested in the following passage from Hudson (1989): “Even mere axiological
uncertainty within an unquestioned subjective consequentialist framework is unhedgeable.
Suppose the agent assigns probability 0.6 to the view that pleasure-minus-pain is the only
intrinsic good, and 0.4 to the view that the good is self-realization. And suppose she must
choose between an act that produces ten hedons and two reals and one that produces nine
hedons and thirty reals. (‘Reals’ are the units in which self-realization is measured.) Which
act should she do? The two axiological theories lead to different answers. Since the hedonic
theory is more probable, perhaps she should accept its answer. But the self-realization theory
seems to find more of a difference between the two actions, and perhaps this should outweigh
its slightly lesser probability. But wait—is a difference of twenty-eight reals really greater
than a difference of one hedon? What is the common measure between hedons and reals?
Note that the agent, for all her uncertainty, believes with complete confidence that there
is no common measure: she is sure that one or the other—pleasure or self-realization—is
intrinsically worthless. Under the circumstances, the two units must be incomparable by the
agent, and so there can be no way for her uncertainty to be taken into account in a reasonable
decision procedure.” (Hudson, 1989, p. 224; italics mine)
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risks of serious wrongdoing, etc. Likewise, insofar as the principles that ground
intertheoretic comparisons are shared by all theories in a comparability class,
the regress problem does not afflict hedging procedures so long as they are kept
internal to such classes. Conditioning one’s credences on the disjunction of all
theories composing such a class, the principles on which the appropriate hedging
procedure is based (e.g. that one should maximize expected value, or should not
take actions that carry a probability greater than .5 of violating a deontological
prohibition) are assigned probability 1, as logical implications of every theory
in the class.
Looking for comparability classes of moral theories within which non-arbitrary
procedures for intertheoretic value comparison can be established is, then, at
least a fruitful starting point for proponents of moral hedging, serving to weaken
many of the standard objections to more “global” hedging procedures. How
easy it will be to find bases for comparison among other kinds of moral the-
ories (contractualist, rule consequentialist, virtue ethical...) and how wide or
narrow these classes will ultimately turn out to be remain open questions. It
seems possible that broader classes of moral theories (e.g. consequentialist or
deontological theories in general) might offer more vague or tenuous bases for
intertheoretic comparisons, while within particular subclasses more definite and
compelling comparisons will be possible. But in any case, so long as there are
clear and compelling comparisons to be made in even a few cases, the problem of
intertheoretic comparisons should not lead us to abandon the hope of rationally
accounting for our moral uncertainties in decision-making.
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